[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]

that relativism itself delivers that normative premise. So let me turn now to rela-
tivism as it is found in philosophical circles, and to an argument for toleration
mounted on the back of this form of relativism.
Philosophers relativism
Moral relativism as defended by philosophers does not draw only on reflections
about the astonishing diversity of moral principles and practices among
mankind. Rather, the best philosophical defences of relativism posit it as the
best theoretical explanation for the existence of this diversity. For example, J.L.
40 TOLERATION
Mackie claims that relativism,
has some force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are
more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than
by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously
inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values.13
The best explanation for the fact of non-convergence on moral matters is that
there is nothing to converge upon: diverse moral principles are products of
diverse ways of life (and only have validity within these ways of life), rather
than cock-eyed approximations to a true morality independent of these ways of
life. David Wong echoes Mackie s  inference to the best explanation strategy of
argument for relativism; however, he makes explicit what he claims to be a
philosophically respectable connection between relativism and toleration. Let
us consider his argument.
Wong s relativism takes the form of a denial that there exists a single true
morality; or, put positively, he permits that there can be more than one true
morality. However, pace the anthropologists, he realises that this reflection in
itself is not sufficient to generate a moral requirement to be tolerant. What the
critics of the anthropologists relativistic arguments for toleration have failed to
register, according to Wong, is that  the relativist arguments of nonphilosophers
also can be interpreted as arguments from moral relativism and one or more
ethical premises to toleration .14 In other words, and as was noted above, what
Wong proposes is the insertion of a normative premise into the relativistic argu-
ment in order to generate the conclusion that we ought to practise toleration.
The normative premise Wong makes use of is inspired by Kant s ethics and is,
he claims, central to the European tradition of thinking about ethics. He calls
this premise  the justification principle :
one should not interfere with the ends of others unless one can justify the
interference to be acceptable to them were they fully rational and informed
of all relevant circumstances. To do otherwise is to fail to treat them with
the respect due to rational beings.15
Wong thinks that combining the justification principle with relativism yields
the following argument for toleration.
If moral relativism is true, two persons A and B can have conflicting moral-
ities that are equally true and that therefore may be equally justified.
Suppose B is required or permitted by his morality to bring about a state of
affairs X. A can bring about some other state of affairs Y that precludes the
coming about of X. It would be a violation of the justification principle for
A to bring about Y, because she could not justify to B the preventing of X.
We thus have an argument for A tolerating B s action according to his
moral beliefs.16
TOLERATION FROM SCEPTICISM 41
Wong s thought here is that, for any person A who is committed to the justifica-
tion principle, their morality forbids them to act so as to prevent another person
B from achieving ends required by B s morality, and that this can be true of A
even if, as relativism has it, her morality and the morality of B with which it
conflicts are equally true and justified.
This argument establishes that A ought to tolerate B if and only if the
following conditions hold:
1 A endorses the justification principle; and
2(i) A does not have any other moral commitments which require her to bring
about Y; or
(ii) A has other moral commitments which require her to bring about Y, but
this requirement is hedged by an  all else being equal qualifier, and A s
endorsement of the justification principle creates a competing requirement
which violates this qualifier and thereby blocks A s requirement to bring
about Y.
There are problems with each of these conditions understood as providing
circumstances in which A can genuinely be in a position to tolerate B. With
respect to condition (2i), if A has no moral commitments which require her to
bring about Y and thereby prevent B from bringing about X then A is not
opposed to B in the way we established in chapter 1 as required for toleration to
be possible. If bringing about Y is a matter of indifference to A then she lacks
opposition to B; or if bringing about Y is not significant enough to A for her to
feel compelled to bring it about, then her opposition to B lacks the quality of
importance necessary for her to be a potential tolerator of B. Either way, the
conflict  if such it is  she has with B is not to be mediated by toleration but,
rather, some other virtue (compromise, perhaps, or canny bargaining).
Turning to (2ii), if A has moral commitments which require her to bring
about Y, then prima facie she is in a position to tolerate B. However, if these
commitments are trumped by her commitment to the justification principle
then it again becomes unclear whether A is in a position to tolerate B. The
justification principle to which A is committed, in Wong s argument, states a
requirement to respect the rational nature in other persons: what prevents A
from acting on the commitment she has to bring about Y, on this reading of the
argument, is her respect for the rational nature in B. But if A has such respect
for B, then it is not clear in what sense she is opposed to B. What is required for
this version of the argument to work is a way of distinguishing between a person
and the person s beliefs and practices, plus an argument to show that opposition
to a person s beliefs and practices can be consistent with respect for the person
herself. Unless this distinction and this account of opposition are possible and
plausible, A s commitment to respect the rational nature in B, on this version of
the argument, disqualifies her as a potential tolerator of B.17
This problem is highlighted in an example given by Wong of how the justifi-
cation principle might operate in a situation in which both A and B accept the
42 TOLERATION
principle. The question, in this case, is which of them ought to act on their
commitment to the justification principle. Wong claims that,
if B engages in homosexual activity with another consenting adult and A
must decide whether to prevent such activity through the law, it would
seem most likely that the justification principle must weigh more heavily
against A s intervention than B s abstinence from homosexual activity.18
Now, apart from the fact that Wong gives no explanation of why the justification
principle ought to weigh more heavily with A than with B  a question I shall
return to shortly  this example shows what is required of a tolerant A on the
reading of the argument just considered. Being committed to and acting upon
the justification principle in practising toleration towards B, A must respect B as
a person while at the same time abhorring his homosexuality. It is not
uncommon for people to make this distinction: we can hate the sin but love the
sinner. However, any argument for toleration must also address harder cases
where making a distinction between a person and her practices and attributes
stretches credulity. For example, can the distinction be made in the case of reli- [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]