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Another aspect of this step is a seeming paradox. The decision maker, while
awaiting a
technological breakthrough at any given time, feels he is suffering from an
embarrassment of riches. As he faces the choice of a course of action he sees
so many ways to proceed that he finds
it difficult to choose any one of them. Furthermore, the rate of advance makes
him hesitate. For
if he chooses, he may soon find that the system selected has been made
obsolete before it is usable.
These aspects have important repercussions. The first is that they delay
decisions. Secondly, the
decision makers press the military planners to examine minutely the entailed
decisions which spring from the courses of action possible. Additionally, they
press them to forecast with
certainty these anticipated effects. A recourse to science is the planner's
response to such
impossible demands.
Here we should note another paradox in this process. The scientist and
technologist are
responsible for advances in knowledge and in applications. Authority in these
fields does not per
se provide insight into what is either commercially or militarily useful. The
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management level in
industry uses scientists for technical advice but does not depend on them for
managerial decisions. However, in the military, management procedures are
designed to have scientists
participate; thus while individual scientists can initiate an advance other
scientists can restrain the project.
Past attempts to put more objectivity into our decision making by considering
cost-effectiveness and by using computers for war games had only a limited
validity. They contain an inherent
danger because the results are inevitably biased, even forced, by the
assumptions governing the game. If the simulation designers do not recognize
crucial factors, those factors will have no
effect on the game results. The main decision is still that of a choice of
strategy which, in turn,
must reflect an assessment of the enemy's strategy.
Many strategic considerations do not lend themselves to computer simulation,
because they cannot take into account all the relevant factors. As an example,
in the computerized war game
situation the surprise element is usually not considered and, therefore, a
basic distortion may be introduced. Modern computers are useful to determine
patterns and to help in visualization, but
they don't substitute for the strategist.
The challenge is to create and execute a technological strategy. Technology
should be the servant
of the strategist, who must be a thorough student of strategy and its history.
The weapon system as such is not the goal of technology. The weapon system is
the tool of the
soldier or of the man carrying out a selected strategy. This is true even of
push-button weapons.
Conflict occurs between men or between societies.
Technology and the Economic Base
[Table of Contents]
Technology develops faster than the economic base. This elementary fact
prevents us from
taking advantage of all technological possibilities. Technology grows
according to geometric
progression, whereas the resource base grows, at best, according to an
algebraic progression.
Sometimes it even retrogresses. Included in this resource base is the human
factor, and that may
not grow at all.
The heart of the matter is not just a question of inventiveness and
organization of the scientists or the scientific base. It is the optimal
utilization of economic resources and the proper integration
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of the technological, economic, and strategic resources. This integration is
essentially a two-way
street. The strategist must be able to request technological solutions for his
problems, which can
range from space warfare to propaganda. But in turn the technologist must tell
the strategist what
the potentials and limitations of his strategy will be.
The Technological War General
[Table of Contents]
In technological warfare, generalship is the key to success, as it always has
been in every conflict. The difference today is that generalship on the
battlefield is perhaps less important than
generalship exercised many years before a battle is joined. This is especially
true of the
generalship that goes into the design and development of weapon systems. The
general who wins
the battle is usually the man who held decisive control ten years before the
fighting started and who, at the moment of battle, is either dead or retired.
Note that this applies equally to Commanders in Chief, and behind them to the
Congress. Andrei
Gromyko has met fourteen American Secretaries of State during his tenure as
Soviet Foreign
Minister. Cyril Korolov commanded the Soviet space program for a considerable
period of time.
The Soviet tyranny, by its nature, has the advantage of being able to make and
keep long range plans. An American President, by contrast, must spend money
and make unpopular decisions
that bring results during the administration of his successors. The temptation
to let the future take
care of itself is intense.
Technological generalship must anticipate strategy, tactics, and technological
trends. It must
develop weapons, equipment and crews. Such developments must be anticipated in
advance of
trends.
Generalship in battle still is of great significance, especially because of
the surprise element in modern war. Here the general must be the man who can
get the maximum performance out of the
systems he actually possesses. He must have an inventive mind, to carry out
modifications that
become desirable. If he cannot overcome a technological lead by the opponent
he must be able to
devise tactics or stratagems to carry out his mission despite technological
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inferiority. While not
necessarily a battle leader -- although battle leaders are still required --
he must be a great thinker. He must have full knowledge of his weapons systems
and those of the opponents.
Finally, he must be able to think through the lessons of the battle, even as
the battle is being fought.
Implicit in this description of generalship is the assumption that the leader
is striving to reach selected goals and that he is using initiative in his
actions. Our technological strategy of the
future must try to take the initiative in a selected field and to defeat the
Soviets clearly on as many occasions as possible. For example, there is no
reason why guerrilla warfare and
counterinsurgency should be their exclusive domain. Technology can make it
possible for us to
contain them in these forms of conflict as well as in nuclear war.
Fortunately, as the lessons of
Vietnam were learned we have devoted some attention to the technology of
people's war.
Conclusion
[Table of Contents]
The U.S. goal is to make the Technological War remain an infinite game; one
which will never be "won" in the sense that one side eliminates the other
through armed conflict, especially nuclear war.
The challenge is clear. We are engaged in a conflict for technological
dominance. The center of
our power position is threatened by the Soviet drive to surpass us and become
superior. While
the relative technological position is important to political, economic,
diplomatic, and psychosocial struggle, it is vital to military conflict.
Superiority in military technology is the prerequisite of strategic success.
This is especially true
in the era of aerospace nuclear warfare, when a surprise attack made possible
by an unexpected technological advance could lead to sudden defeat of the
seemingly strongest power. The danger
is especially acute in the current period when expanding technology can be [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]